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Although laws restricting smoking in restaurants are becoming commonplace, most 
research has focused on either the health beneﬁts that laws may provide customers 
and workers or whether laws harm owners. But while smoking laws may directly 
alter proﬁts, owners may alter prices, output, and other business attributes in ways 
that aﬀect the welfare of customers and workers. This study examines whether 
restaurant and bar owners alter prices, entertainment, hours of operation and 
other business attributes in response to local smoking laws. Substantial support is 
found for these attribute changes in the Wisconsin hospitality industry. One implica­
tion is that an overall assessment of the desirability of smoking laws should consider 
economic eﬀects imposed on owners, customers and workers, as well as health 
beneﬁts that follow laws. 
I .  INTRODUCTION  set contains detailed information at the individual business 
level and provides data on establishments that have been 
Laws that ban or restrict smoking in restaurants are subjected to local smoking laws as well as those that cur-
becoming more prevalent. Public health groups advocate rently operate without them. The analysis therefore exam-
such laws on the basis of controlling second-hand smoke ines whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the 
and/or possible health beneﬁts to non-smoking customers actual and predicted eﬀects of laws. This comparison is 
and workers. However, in order to examine the overall important for assessing predictions made concerning the 
impact of smoking restrictions, the economic eﬀects of extension of laws onto other localities. 
these policies should also be examined. These laws may The paper begins with a survey of the literature on the 
directly alter proﬁts and changes in business environments economic eﬀects of smoking laws on restaurants and bars. 
may lead owners to alter prices, output, and other business Next, a series of hypotheses on the relationship between 
attributes in ways that aﬀect the welfare of all customers smoking laws and owners, customers and employees are 
and workers. developed, followed by the presentation of data and an 
An overall assessment of the desirability of smoking laws empirical model. An overall assessment of the evidence 
then should consider all of these eﬀects. While a few studies concludes the paper. 
examine the eﬀects of smoking laws on restaurant owners, 
there is little research that examines the economic eﬀects 
imposed on customers and workers. This paper examines II .  PREVIOUS  LITERATURE  
the economic eﬀects imposed on owners, customers 
and workers in roughly 1,000 restaurants and bars in Most of the literature in this area addresses whether or not 
Wisconsin. Wisconsin provides a good case study because smoking bans lower the revenues (as a proxy for proﬁts) of 
its adult smoking rate is 23.7%, which is similar to the restaurants and bars. This literature follows one of two 
median smoking rate of 22.8% for all states.1 The data directions. One direction focuses on impacts on individual 
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1 1999 data obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Wisconsin ranks 35th out of 50 states when listed from lowest 
to highest adult smoking rates. 
owners. Dunham and Marlow (2000b) examined the dis­
tribution of expected eﬀects of smoking laws on revenues 
using data from a nationwide survey of 1,300 restaurants 
and bars. For restaurants, 6% of owners predicted that 
bans raise revenues, 39% predicted lower revenues, and 
55% predicted no changes. For bars and taverns, a ban 
was predicted to raise revenues by 2% of owners, lower 
revenues by 83%, and produce no change by 
13%. Predictions of gains, losses and no eﬀects on revenues 
are found to be consistent with how owners allocate seating 
within their establishments. That is, the lower was seating 
allocated to non-smoking use, the higher the probability 
that an owner predicted that a smoking ban lowered rev­
enues. This result indicates that seating allocations are 
made on the basis of proﬁts, as is consistent with an eﬃ­
cient private accommodation market. 
The other research direction aggregates all establishments 
into one ‘community-wide’ impact. A number of studies 
have concluded that businesses do not suﬀer reduced sales 
as a result of bans. Glantz and Smith (1994) compare 15 
cities with smoking laws with 15 matched control group 
cities. They conclude: ‘[L]egislators and government oﬃcials 
can enact such health and safety requirements to protect 
patrons and employees in restaurants from the toxins 
in second-hand tobacco smoke without the fear of adverse 
economic consequences.’ In their study of smoking laws 
in North Carolina, Goldstein and Sobel (1998) conclude: 
‘Even in the number one tobacco-producing state in the 
U.S., ETS regulations present no adverse economic impact, 
and there is no need for exceptions to the ordinances based 
on such fears.’ Sciacca and Ratliﬀ (1998) conclude in their 
study of Arizona ﬁrms that: ‘This study seems to indicate 
that prohibiting smoking in all Flagstaﬀ restaurants has 
had no eﬀect on total restaurant sales.’ 
Dunham and Winegarden (1999) examined data from 
the 1996 survey of restaurant owners discussed above in 
Dunham and Marlow (2000b) and found that customers 
patronize hospitality establishments in order to placate 
three distinct needs: the desire for food, the desire for social 
companionship and the desire to seek status. Smoking bans 
appear to positively impact restaurants that supply the ﬁrst 
need, while harming those that supply the other two. The 
authors conclude that the actual impact of the smoking 
ban on a particular restaurant depends on how that 
establishment meets the three needs. 
The literature review indicates three important research 
issues that will extend the overall understanding of the 
welfare eﬀects of smoking laws. First, most studies have 
only considered the welfare of owners, either individually 
or collectively, thus missing possible eﬀects imposed on 
customers and workers. Second, in addition to focusing 
on the economic eﬀect on businesses, the existing literature 
tends to examine revenues, or sales taxes, rather than busi­
ness proﬁts or consumer costs, thus providing an incom­
plete measure of economic welfare. Third, studies of 
individual owners have focused on expected rather than 
actual eﬀects of laws because of limitations of data collec­
tion. Biases that complicate the understanding of the eco­
nomic eﬀects of smoking laws may arise when expected and 
actual eﬀects of laws diﬀer. As discussed below, the data 
examined in this study address these three problem areas. 
III . 	  THE  EFFECTS  OF  SMOKING  LAWS  ON  
BUSINESSES  AND  CONSUMERS  
Governments have justiﬁed the imposition of smoking 
restrictions by claiming that smoking creates negative 
externalities and harms the health of non-smokers.2 
While the issue of externalities is clearly important 
for public policy, this paper concentrates on the 
economic eﬀects that smoking laws may exert on 
owners, customers and workers in the restaurant and bar 
industries. Examination of economic eﬀects provides 
another piece to the overall assessment of the desirability 
of smoking laws. 
In the absence of smoking laws, smoking policies are set 
by owners who determine air space allocation within their 
establishments. That is, owners decide in which areas 
smoking will be allowed, as well as whether to invest in 
smoking patios, partitions that separate smokers from 
non-smokers, and air ﬁltration. Coase (1960) provides a 
general framework that may be applied to how private 
owners allocate their air space in cases where externalities 
may be present.3 
Coase (1960) argued that resources could be allocated 
eﬃciently as long as they are privately owned, transferable 
and transactions costs are trivial. This appears to be the 
case with air space within private establishments. The space 
in the restaurant is privately owned and, in eﬀect, owners 
rent it to customers who value these resources the most. 
Smokers and non-smokers compete for the scarce resources 
and owners will allocate space to the demander with the 
highest bid. The same process is consistent with other allo­
cation decisions of businesses. Department stores allocate 
space between men’s clothing and women’s garments, gro­
cery stores allocate space between meats and vegetables, 
and theatres allocate between comedy and drama. In the 
case of restaurants, owners determine what smoking poli­
cies are consistent with maximum proﬁts by taking into 
account the competing demands of smoking and non­
smoking customers. More air space will be smoke-free as 
2 Gravelle and Zimmerman (1994) argue that passive smoke risk is over-estimated by OSHA.
 
3 Boyes and Marlow (1996) provide a discussion of how the Coase Theorem may be applied to smoking within restaurants and bars.
 
non-smokers out-bid smokers, and vice versa. Whether 
owners cater solely to smokers, to nonsmokers, or accom­
modate both, depends on customer preferences and the 
marginal costs of accommodation.4 
The other condition presented by Coase is that trans­
actions costs be trivial. At ﬁrst glance, it would appear 
highly unlikely that smoking and non-smoking customers 
could separately negotiate over the air space because this 
might mean that policies change by the hour or day, or that 
customers must declare how they value the air space. 
However, owners intermediate between smoking and 
non-smoking customers thus eliminating the need for 
costly negotiations. Owners have proﬁt incentives to allo­
cate resources eﬃciently and air space allocation will be 
eﬃcient when they cannot change smoking policies and 
raise proﬁts at the same time. 
An important implication of the resource allocation pro­
cess is that owners will not adopt uniform smoking policies 
when customers exhibit diverse smoking preferences and 
owners face diverse marginal costs of accommodation. 
Marginal accommodation costs are likely to diﬀer between 
establishments because some buildings may be more easily 
adapted to physical separations and air ﬁltration systems. 
Moreover, some owners may face customers who believe 
that separations or air ﬁltration systems are eﬀective in 
removing smoke and others may have customers who 
believe that smoking should be forbidden. The basic 
point remains that a diverse set of smoking policies exists 
prior to smoking laws because a one-size-ﬁts-all policy is 
not eﬃcient when customers display diverse smoking 
preferences and owners face diﬀerent marginal costs of 
accommodation.5 
Smoking laws shift ownership of the air space from busi­
ness owners to individuals who prefer that government 
restrictions or bans take place. However, restaurant owners 
are now forbidden from ‘selling’ resources to smokers, 
even if they could out-bid non-smokers. Air space 
resources are therefore no longer transferable and proﬁts 
may fall unless business owners somehow fully shift bur­
dens of the law onto customers or workers. Of course, cases 
may arise where laws are consistent with pre-law policies, 
but these events may be uncommon in locations where 
smoking preferences and marginal accommodation costs 
vary considerably across businesses. 
The discussion thus far suggests the hypothesis that 
smoking laws exert three possible eﬀects on proﬁts, assum­
ing that owners proﬁt-maximized prior to government 
restrictions. One, proﬁts fall when laws lower demand 
and/or raise costs. Two, proﬁts increase when laws raise 
demand and/or lower costs. Three, proﬁts do not change 
when laws do not aﬀect demand or costs, or changes in 
demand are equal and opposite to changes in costs. 
Another hypothesis is that bars are more likely to experi­
ence proﬁt declines than restaurants. Dunham and Marlow 
(2000b) report evidence indicating that bars are more than 
twice as likely to experience revenue drops as restaurants. 
Unlike patrons in restaurants, bar customers often partici­
pate in dining, drinking, listening to music, dancing, and 
playing pool or darts whereby they roam during visits 
interacting with other patrons. Bar owners may also ﬁnd 
it more costly to separate smokers and nonsmokers 
because it is too costly to provide separate bands, dance 
ﬂoors, poolrooms, etc., for both smokers and non-smokers. 
As discussed above, previous studies do not address 
whether the economic eﬀects of smoking laws extend well 
beyond eﬀects on individual owners when burdens are 
shifted onto their customers and workers. A smoking law 
may represent a cost for restaurants and bars and, as with 
any cost, owners have incentives to attempt to shift bur­
dens onto others. Food and drink prices may rise or fall 
and meal portions, hours of operation, service quality 
are other attributes that might undergo change. Owners 
may also shift burdens onto workers through lower 
compensation or added responsibilities.6 
It is hypothesized that owners will not follow identical 
strategies when they attempt to shift burdens onto others. 
For example, owners with price elastic demands may tend 
to raise prices less often than owners facing price inelastic 
demands. Proﬁt changes and the manner and extent to 
which burdens are shifted onto consumers and workers 
may be inﬂuenced by many factors including: age and 
size of business, type of business, the percentage of custo­
mers who smoke, and the competitive nature and size of 
local markets. 
An important implication of this discussion is that 
simple observation of sales or proﬁt changes following a 
smoking law may oﬀer a limited picture of the true welfare 
eﬀects. Higher proﬁts, for instance, may be consistent with 
higher prices and lower compensation for workers thus 
clouding the issue of how desirable a smoking law is for 
society. Clearly, there are many possible changes when we 
consider eﬀects imposed on individual owners, customers 
and workers. 
IV. 	  DESCRIPTION  AND  SUMMARY  OF  
SURVEY  DATA  
A total of 978 owners of restaurants, bars and taverns in 
Wisconsin were surveyed by ETC Institute of Olathe, 
4 The importance of accommodating nonsmokers is evident in industry trade magazines. See for example, Walter (1994) and Fruchtman
 
(1992).
 
5 See Dunham and Marlow (2000a) and Dunham and Marlow (2003).
 
6 Owners may also attempt to shift burdens onto vendors or landlords by lowering payments or rents.
 
Table 1. Eﬀects of restrictions on proﬁts (actual and predicted) 
Restaurants with 
govt restrictions Restaurants with 
All restaurants or bans no restrictions All bars 
(n ¼ 550) (n ¼ 172) (n ¼ 378) (n ¼ 428) 
Decrease 54% (296) 38% (66) 61% (148) 81% (345) 
Increase 3% (18) 5% (8) 3% (10) 1% (2) 
No change 37% (206) 50% (86) 32% (120) 13% (55) 
Don’t know 5% (30) 7% (12) 5% (18) 6% (26) 
Kansas, during February and March 2001.7 Of those sur­
veyed, 56% consisted of restaurant owners (550) and 44% 
consisted of bar and tavern owners (428). This sample 
represents precision of at least þ/� 3.3% at the 95% 
level of conﬁdence. 
Potential for bias is always a concern with survey data.8 
Owners may oppose smoking laws for personal reasons 
and, as a result, exaggerate proﬁt losses and changes in 
prices, hours of operation and other business attributes. 
Those who favour laws may also exaggerate proﬁt gains, 
falsely report no changes in proﬁts, or in other ways indi­
cate incorrect information regarding other issues. With 
no information on the likelihood of misinformation, it 
remains unclear whether personal views would over-ride 
preferences for maximizing the value of ﬁrms. 
This study is the ﬁrst to examine both predictions and 
actual changes regarding proﬁts and other variables. 
Owners subject to smoking restrictions and bans reported 
actual eﬀects, while those who were not subject to laws 
reported predictions. Thirty-one percent of restaurant 
owners, and virtually no bar owners, were subject to 
restrictions or bans, thus providing information on actual 
eﬀects of smoking laws. Information on predictions and 
actual changes will be compared to determine if signiﬁcant 
diﬀerences between these two groups exist. 
Even without biased responses related to personal views 
of owners, it is likely that signiﬁcant diﬀerences will exist 
between responses by those subject to government laws and 
those who are not. Dunham and Marlow (2000a) support 
this prediction when they conclude that smoking laws are 
passed in states with relatively few smokers and therefore 
businesses subject to such laws are less likely to experience 
lower proﬁts simply because they service fewer smokers. 
This prediction is consistent with the survey data examined 
here because the average percentage of smoking customers 
is 28% for restaurants with laws and 40% for those 
without.9 In other words, restaurants located in areas 
that do not have smoking restrictions service 43% more 
smoking customers than those in locations with them. 
As the analysis shows, businesses serving relatively few 
smokers will experience less harm than businesses serving 
relatively many. 
Responses also support the view that the private market 
provides a diverse array of smoking policies – thus support­
ing the prediction that proﬁt changes will not be uniform 
across establishments. For example, 18% of restaurants, 
but only 0.2% of bars, provide smoke-free facilities, 
while 34% of restaurants allow smoking throughout, and 
97% of bars allow smoking throughout. On average, 44% 
of seating in restaurants is non-smoking.10 For restaurants 
with smoking restrictions, average non-smoking seating 
use is 56% and, for those without restrictions, average 
non-smoking seating is 34%. 
V.  EFFECTS  ON  OWNERS  
Table 1 displays responses in four categories to the ques­
tion of how proﬁts would change following a smoking ban: 
all restaurant owners, restaurant owners currently subject 
to bans or restrictions, owners not subject to bans or 
restrictions, and all bar owners. Responses for restaurant 
owners without any bans or restrictions and for bar owners 
are predictions of impacts, while responses for those 
subject to bans or restrictions are actual impacts. 
Responses are consistent with previous studies that indi­
cate that smoking bans do not impose identical economic 
eﬀects across establishments. Proﬁt gains are the least com­
mon response, as indicated by 5% or fewer owners, thus 
indicating that bans provide relatively few economic bene­
ﬁts. Lower proﬁts are indicated by 38% of restaurant own­
ers currently subjected to bans, 61% of restaurant owners 
7 The survey was funded by Philip Morris Management Corp., however, this was not disclosed to respondents.
 
8 See Berrens et al. (1997) and Kerkvliet (1994) for concerns with survey data.
 
9 The diﬀerence in means is signiﬁcant at the .01 level.
 
10 In restaurants that restrict smoking to certain areas, 34% allowed smoking in bar areas, 31% in separate smoking areas, 29% in non­
smoking sections, 16% in outdoor areas, 14% in separate rooms, and 4% in separately ventilated rooms (multiple responses allowed).
 
Table 2. Logit estimations of proﬁt reduction 
All restaurants 
Restaurants with 
restrictions or bans 
Restaurants without 
restrictions or bans 
constant 0.60 �0.10 0.80 
2.47 0.20 2.72 
nsi, non-smoking seating �0.02* �0.01** �0.02* 
7.68 2.54 6.76 
alcoholi, % alcohol revenues 0.02* 0.02*** 0.01* 
3.41 1.66 2.75 
chaini, chain dummy �0.21 �0.20 �0.29 
0.60 0.40 0.60 
agei, years in business 0.0001 0.004 �0.003 
0.02 0.50 0.43 
seatsi, number of seats 0.002** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
2.44 1.75 1.80 
Log likelihood �276.47 �90.11 �229.50 
Observations 496 149 347 
Obs. with dep ¼ 0 218 88 130 
Obs. with dep ¼ 1 278 61 217 
Notes: t-statistics below estimated coeﬃcients; *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
with no restrictions, and 81% of bar owners. Responses 
support the above prediction that owners not subject to 
laws predict proﬁt losses more often than those currently 
subject to smoking laws. The higher percentage of bar 
owners predicting proﬁt losses than restaurant owners 
is also consistent with Dunham and Marlow (2000b). 
A qualitative choice model estimates the probability that 
a restaurant owner with a given set of attributes reports 
that bans lower proﬁts. Bar owners are excluded here 
because a vast majority (81%) of their responses indicated 
lower proﬁts. The following logit model is estimated and 
follows the model estimated in Dunham and Marlow 
(2000b):11 
profitchangei¼ fðnsi, alcoholi, chaini, agei, seatsiÞ ð1Þ 
where nsi ¼ percentage of seating allocated to non-smoking 
use, alcoholi ¼ share of revenues from alcohol, chaini ¼ 1 if  
ﬁrm is a member of a corporate chain; 0 otherwise, agei ¼ 
years owner has been in business, seatsi ¼ number of seats. 
The dependent variable proﬁtchangei ¼ 0 if owner has 
experienced or expects no change or a rise in proﬁt, 
and ¼ 1 if proﬁt falls. As discussed above, previous studies 
of individual owners focused on revenues or sales and, 
because they do not measure proﬁts, do not provide clear 
measurement of economic eﬀects on owners. 
The percentage of seating allocated to non-smoking use 
nsi is expected to exert a negative inﬂuence on the prob­
ability that proﬁts fall since this variable indicates how 
many non-smokers are served. Proﬁt losses are predicted 
to be more likely the lower the share of non-smoking 
seating. 
The share of revenues from alcohol, alcoholi, is expected 
to exert a positive inﬂuence on the likelihood of proﬁts 
falling because higher alcohol revenues indicate a more 
‘bar-like’ atmosphere that is more social. As discussed 
above, bar owners have been found to be much more likely 
to experience proﬁt reduction thus suggesting that losses 
are more likely in restaurants that are more ‘bar-like’ than 
other restaurants. 
Membership in a chain is measured by chaini and equals 
1 if ﬁrm is a member of a corporate chain, and equals 0 
otherwise. Whether a business is part of a corporate chain 
is also expected to inﬂuence responses if chain members 
oﬀer greater accommodation of smokers and nonsmokers 
as an element of overall corporate strategy. This view sug­
gests that chain members are less likely to experience proﬁt 
reduction with the expected sign on chaini being negative. 
Age of business, agei, is hypothesized to positively aﬀect 
probabilities of proﬁt reduction as accommodation costs 
may be positively related to age of buildings and older 
ﬁrms may accommodate less, given that they tend to 
cater to more established and stable customer bases than 
newer businesses. 
Number of seats, seatsi, is expected to exert a positive 
inﬂuence when scale economies exist in accommodation 
when, for instance, it may be cheaper to separate smokers 
from nonsmokers in larger establishments. Larger restau­
rants then are predicted to experience proﬁt loss more 
often because they are more likely to have accommodated 
relatively more smokers prior to a government ban. 
Table 2 displays logit estimations for three samples: all 
restaurant owners, owners subject to smoking laws (actual 
11 Dunham and Marlow (2000b) ﬁnd non-smoking seating (negative), chain (negative), age (positive) variables exerting signiﬁcant 
inﬂuences on their logit model of whether or not an owner experiences a fall in revenues. 
Table 3. Attribute changes (observations in parentheses) 
Restaurants with Restaurants with 
govt restrictions or bans no restrictions All bars 
(n ¼ 172) (n ¼ 378 ) (n ¼ 428) 
Eﬀects on consumers 
Raise prices 20% (35) 31% (118) 34% (145) 
Lower prices 3% (5) 2% (7) 7% (28) 
Introduce promotions 22% (37) 31% (116) 35% (151) 
More entertainment 2% (4) 7% (25) 19% (79) 
Less entertainment 3% (6) 5% (18) 11% (48) 
Lengthen hours 3% (6) 4% (15) 4% (19) 
Lower hours 7% (12) 21% (78) 29% (124) 
Eﬀects on workers 
Lower beneﬁts 7% (12) 17% (65) 16% (68) 
Raise responsibilities 9% (16) 14% (52) 10% (42) 
changes) and owners not subject to laws (predictions). 
Estimation supports expectations concerning non-smoking 
seating, alcohol revenues and number of seats. Higher 
shares of non-smoking seating lower the probability that 
owners expect adverse revenue eﬀects while higher revenue 
shares from alcohol raise the probability. These eﬀects are 
signiﬁcant for all three samples, but are weaker in cases of 
owners subject to laws. As discussed above, proﬁt losses 
are less likely for owners subject to laws simply because 
their customers would tend to be more favorable to those 
restrictions in the ﬁrst place than communities that have 
not adopted such laws. Number of seats exerts a positive 
inﬂuence on the likelihood of proﬁt loss in all three estima­
tions. Membership in a corporate chain and age of business 
exert no signiﬁcant eﬀects on the probability of proﬁt loss 
in any of three estimations. 
In sum, logit estimations indicate three signiﬁcant inﬂu­
ences on the likelihood that an owner reports lower proﬁts 
following a smoking ban: shares of seating devoted to non­
smoking use, share of revenues from alcohol, and number 
of seats. 
VI. 	  EFFECTS  ON  CUSTOMERS  AND  
WORKERS  
Consumers can also be aﬀected when owners re-arrange 
their businesses in response to smoking laws. Table 3 dis­
plays economic eﬀects stemming from whether owners 
raise or lower prices, introduce promotions, raise or 
lower entertainment, and raise or lower hours of operation. 
Responses are displayed for three groups: restaurant own­
ers subject to smoking laws (actual responses), restaurant 
owners not subject to laws (predictions), and all bar own­
ers. Twenty percent of restaurant owners subject to bans, 
31% of owners without laws, and 34% of bar owners 
indicate that bans cause price hikes. In contrast, 3% of 
restaurant owners subject to laws, 2% of owners without 
laws, and 7% of bar owners indicate that bans cause price 
reductions. 
Twenty-two percent of restaurant owners subject to 
laws, 31% of restaurant owners without laws, and 35% 
of bar owners indicate that bans cause them to introduce 
promotions. Few restaurant owners indicate that bans 
cause them to raise or lower entertainment; however, bar 
owners were more likely to indicate entertainment 
changes.12 Finally, only 3–4% of all owners indicate that 
they would stay open longer, but from 7–29% would 
reduce hours of operation. 
Table 3 also displays eﬀects imposed on workers follow­
ing a smoking ban. Seven percent of owners subject to 
laws, 17% of owners without laws, and 16% of bar owners 
indicate that a smoking ban causes them to lower beneﬁts 
to workers. Nine percent of restaurant owners subject to 
laws, 14% of restaurant owners not subject to laws, and 
10% of bar owners indicate that they have or would raise 
responsibilities of workers. 
An important implication here is that evidence of gains 
or no change in proﬁts indicate only that laws exert no 
adverse economic eﬀects on owners, but reveals nothing 
about attribute changes that inﬂuence the welfare of cus­
tomers and workers. Table 4 summarizes the results of logit 
estimations where attribute changes are regressed against a 
variable indicating whether or not an owner experiences a 
proﬁt reduction. A ‘þ’ eﬀect indicates that owners with 
proﬁt reductions are more likely to undertake a given attri­
bute, while a ‘�’ eﬀect indicates that they are less likely to 
pursue it. No eﬀects, or blanks in the table, indicate that 
pursuit of a given attribute is unrelated to whether an 
owner experiences falling proﬁts. 
12 Nineteen percent would raise entertainment and 11% would lower entertainment. 
Table 4. Summary of whether owners with proﬁt losses undertake attribute changes more often than other 
owners (þ or � eﬀects, when signiﬁcant) 
Restaurants with 
govt restrictions Restaurants with 
or bans no restrictions All bars 
(n ¼ 172) (n ¼ 378 ) (n ¼ 428) 
Eﬀects on consumers 
Raise prices 
Lower prices 
þ* þ* þ* 
Introduce promotions 
More entertainment 
Less entertainment 
Lengthen hours 
þ* 
þ*** 
þ* 
þ** 
þ*** 
þ* 
þ** 
Lower hours 
Eﬀects on workers 
þ* þ* þ* 
Lower beneﬁts 
Raise responsibilities 
þ** þ* 
þ* 
þ* 
Notes: t-statistics below estimated coeﬃcients; *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively. 
Logit estimations indicate that, for all establishments, 
proﬁt reductions signiﬁcantly raise the likelihood that an 
owner raises prices, introduces promotions, lowers enter­
tainment, and lowers hours of operation. Only restaurant 
owners not subject to smoking laws indicate that proﬁt 
reduction raises the likelihood of increasing entertainment. 
Lower beneﬁts to workers are more likely to arise when 
establishments suﬀer proﬁt reductions, but only restaurant 
owners not subject to smoking laws are more likely to raise 
responsibilities when proﬁts fall. Probabilities of under­
taking price drops and lengthening hours of operation 
are unrelated to whether or not there is a proﬁt reduction. 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS  
This study is an initial attempt at uncovering the economic 
eﬀects of smoking laws experienced by owners, customers 
and workers. While previous research by public health 
advocates has focused on health beneﬁts enjoyed by non­
smoking customers and restaurant workers, a thorough 
assessment of the eﬀects of smoking laws should also 
include economic beneﬁts and costs that extend to owners, 
customers and workers. 
This examination of Wisconsin restaurants and bars 
indicates that smoking bans exert eﬀects on proﬁts that 
vary by establishment, and that bars are much more likely 
to experience proﬁt losses than restaurants. Owners not 
subject to laws more often stated that bans lower proﬁts, 
but this result is consistent with the view that locations with 
smoking laws service relatively few smokers. This suggests 
that predictions of proﬁt loss are likely to be understated 
when they are projected onto other localities because 
locations with laws tend to service relatively fewer smokers 
than locations without laws. 
Economic eﬀects experienced by owners extend beyond 
those who cater to many smoking customers. In addition to 
seating devoted to non-smoking use, which measures 
importance of smoking customers, alcohol sales and size 
of restaurant inﬂuence the probability of lower proﬁts. 
Owners of larger ‘bar-like’ restaurants are more likely to 
experience lower proﬁts than others, holding constant the 
degree to which they cater to smokers. 
Economic eﬀects are also found to extend beyond own­
ers as bans lead to changes in prices, promotions, entertain­
ment, hours of operation, and beneﬁts and responsibilities 
of workers. Most actions were found to be more likely 
when establishments experience a proﬁt reduction, and 
eﬀects are not isolated to smokers. 
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